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Introduction
LINWOOD URBAN and DOUGLAS N. WALTON

An important component of most monotheistic religions is the belief
that God is almighty or all-powerful.
all-powerftrl. Certainly this conception is
strongly fixed in Christianity. Occasionally Western religious philoso
philosophers or theologians have conceded that God may not be literally allpowerful, that he cannot do quite literally anything, yet even in this
concession it is generally maintained that God is very powerful, or that
awethe limits of his powers are beyond the human imagination and awe
some in their scope.
The reasons for stress upon the extensive power of God are not dif
difficult to discover. First, the Perfection, the Holiness, and the Majesty
of God seem to demand that he transcend the world and everything
which is in it. Hence he is said to be supremely wise and supremely
powerful. Second, only such a being seems to be a fitting object of
worship. If God has maximal power, then man's
man’s sense of awe and
man's fear of
wonder is magnified. Stupendous power makes credible man’s
the
Lord.
the Lord.
Third, only a God who has supreme power is a fitting object of trust
and can assure salvation. The best guarantee that God will be able to
keep his promises and answer prayers is that no being is stronger than
he. For while maximal power breeds fear of God, it also brings assur
assurance that he can do what he wills to do.
So essential an attribute ought to have been thoroughly examined in
philosophical theology, but this has not been the case. Traditionally,
more attention has been paid to the divine attribute of omniscience in-
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sofar as it has been distinguished from omnipotence. The literature in
philosophical theology specifically on omniscience is more volumi
voluminous, the
the lines
lines of controversy more clearly drawn. Perhaps the notion
nous,
of infinite power has seemed too obscure, too shrouded in mystery and
ineffability for us to analyze our feelings of awe and bring them into
the domain of pure concepts. Yet recently, skeptics have challenged
theologians with arguments that center on omnipotence, pressing theo
theologians to clarify the meaning of this enigmatic property. One such
argument is
is the
the argument from evil.
argument
1.
1. Evil

The argument from evil claims that classical Western theism, based on
a deity infinitely wise
wise,, powerful, and just, is hopelessly involved in
logical contradiction. How is it possible to reconcile the death by
cancer of a small child with the existence of a just and benevolent
deity sufficiently powerful to have circumvented this tragedy? In the
face of this challenge, several options are open to the theist. He may
deny that there is evil. However, the endless catalogue of suffering,
deprivation, and distress of human beings and nature’s
nature's appalling waste
seem sufficient to demonstrate vast evil in the world. He may deny
that God is almighty or deny that God is omniscient. He may likewise
deny that God is morally excellent. No one of these alternatives is par
particularly attractive; but if the argument from evil is sound, one of the
traditional attributes will have to be sacrificed.
sacrificed .
However, in controversy the lines of assault are often not chosen by
the defender, but by the aggressor. The militant atheist wants to show
either that God does not exist or that he is irrelevant to human con
concern.
Hence
he
has
not
usually
attacked
the
notion
of
God's
moral
excern.
God’s
ex
cellence. A morally depraved but omnipotent God would be a source
of much human anxiety. However, a God who lacks omnipotence
might safely be forgotten. A morally excellent God who struggles
against evil and yet who is not able to bring about his good designs is
caught in the same
~ame tragic situation as are men. Hence he is more to be
pitied than to be worshipped.

The arguer from evil thus attempts a reductio ad absurdum of classical
theism. He questions whether God is literally omnipotent or whether
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there
whatever reason,
reason, he
he cannot
prevent. The
The
there are
are some
some evils
evils that,
that, for
for whatever
cannot prevent.
task
task faced
faced by Christian
Christian theodicy
theodicy is to explain or justify evil
evil without
eroding omnipotence to such a point that the deity thus described
becomes irrelevant.
becomes
irrelevant.

2.
2. Flew's
Flaw’s Challenge
Challenge
The skeptic who argues from evil suggests that classical theism is
meaningful, but false. Recently some challengers have attempted to
theoldemonstrate the stronger thesis that the basic tenets of classical theol
ogy
are
not
merely
false,
but
meaningless
in
the
sense
that
they
do
not
ogy are not merely false, but meaningless in the sense that they do not
really assert anything about the world. The most notable protagonist of
this view is Antony Flew. In the tradition of Logical Positivism,
Flew
Hew laid it down that any cognitively meaningful statement, i.e., one
that
the world,
world, must
must be
be such
that
that makes
makes aa genuine
genuine assertion
assertion about
about the
such that
some conceivable evidence could conclusively falsify it.'
it. 1 Many
religious utterances were once meaningful in this sense, but are no
longer so since they have been "killed
“killed by inches, the death by a
thousand
qualifications."
Isaiah
proclaimed
that the
the righteous
righteous God
thousand qualifications.” Isaiah proclaimed that
God
ruled the world. He supported this claim by appealing to the fact that
Assyria was about to overwhelm a sinful and unfaithful Israel. But
'God rules
rules the
the world”
world'' that
that
today believers
believers have
the claim'
today
have so
so qualified
qualified the
claim “God
no
no conceivable
conceivable evidence
evidence ever
ever seems
seems to hold good against it. Whoever
wins in battle, God is still said to arrange everything. Since the claim
is now consistent with every conceivable state of affairs, it cannot be
falsified and thus cannot be taken to assert a fact about the world.
This challenge was particularly acute for the believer who refused to
qualify the traditional conception of God: he insisted that God is all
loving and
and all
all powerful
powerful and
and that no amount of
of evil in the world could
could
falsify his claim. Attempts to buttress his position by saying ''God
“God
works
works in
in mysterious
mysterious ways''
ways” seemed
seemed an obvious
obvious evasion.
evasion. Flew and
and
others drew the conclusion that most religious utterances which
seemed to make genuine assertions were actually without assertive
force.

This skeptical attack of the verificationists seemed a temporary secular
triumph. It actually had the effect of eliciting the concession of cogni-
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tive
live emptiness of religious utterances from some theologians
theologians;; an effect
that,
remarked , seemed rather like a civil rights
that, as Alvin Plantinga remarked,
worker welcoming the Ku Klux Klan.
Subsequen
nts within the philosophy of science, however,
Subsequentt developme
developments
soon had the effect of eroding and neutralizin
neutralizing
Flew’s challenge.
g Flew's
Statements of the so-called Verification Principle were overwhelmed
overwhelmed
by counter-ex
amples and difficulties
counter-examples
difficulties.. It became increasingl
increasingly
y clear that
aa statement
statement of the Verification Principle that would permit the claims
of natural science to count as meaningful and rule out the claims of
theology and metaphysic
metaphysicss could not be produced.
produced . Flew assumed that
any
meaningfu
l
statement
must
be
capable
any meaningful
of conclusive falsification,
falsification,
i.e., we must be able to conceive of a state of affairs in which the
statement
Unfortunately even some very
statement could
could be shown to be false. Unfortunately
simple claims characteris
tically made by scientists fail to meet this
characteristically
test. In an infinite universe, the claim "For
test.
“For every metal there is an
acid that will dissolve it”
it'' can neither be conclusive
conclusively
fal
ly verified or falsified. The statement might be verified on the planet earth; but then on
another
another planet, a metal that could not be dissolved by any known acid
might be found. However, on another planet a new acid might be disdis
covered,
and
so
on
ad
infinitum.
As
a
covered,
result, it turns out that it is theotheo
retically
retically impossible to verify or to falsify the universal claims that
have an important place in the physical sciences. Although some phi
philosophers of science have clung to the notion of empirical verifiability
as
as an
an article
article of faith, others have become increasingl
increasingly
ac
y reluctant to accept
cept what seemed a kind of simplistic empiricism associated with early
statements
n Principle. Most philosophers
statements of the Verificatio
Verification
re
philosophers have rejected Flew's
Flew’s challenge and admit that a statement is factually meanmean
ingful as long as some empirical evidence counts for or against the
claim.
claim. Since the good and evil found in the world count for and
against the existence of God, theology is once again meaningful.
meaningful.

3.
3. Power and Freedom
The skeptics'
skeptics’ strongest line of attack is then to concentrate upon the
supposed
supposed incoherenc
incoherencee of the traditional conception of God. In order to
bring his point home, he sometimes argues as follows. If God is om-
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affairs . Why then did
nipotent, then he can create any possible state of affairs.
acdo right? It is ac
freely
always
people
which
in
he not create a world
therefore
is
right-it
do
freely
sometimes
tually the case that people
right—it
possilogically possible that people should always freely do right. It is possi
actualize
can
God
omnipotent
an
Since
exist.
not
ble that evil might
any possibility, it follows that he must have been able to prevent evil.
Why then, did he not? Given the assumption that God is omnipotent
it appears
and given the presence of actual moral evil in the world, it
appears
that God must have failed to create a world in which all men freely
can
choose what is right through lack of moral excellence. How then can
the attributes of benevolence, justice, and moral perfection be saved
for a God who is able yet unwilling to prevent or even lessen the pain,
world?
misery, and injustice in the world?
The characteristic response of the theologian, perhaps the only rebuttal
that has even partially succeeded in effectively meeting the thrust of
Defence. ' This reply asserts
this argument, is called the 'Free
‘Free Will Defence.’
God’s decision to create men having the power to freely
first that God's
choose between good and evil is the best choice he could have made.
Creatures who can freely choose between good and evil are better
creatures than necessitated beings. Second, if men choose to do evil,
dethat is up to them, not up to God. In other words, the Free Will de
fender concedes that it is possible that God could have created a world
in which no evil exists if in fact it had turned out that, through their
free choice, men had always done the right thing. That, however, the
world has not turned out this way is not something that God could
have remedied. Only the individual moral agents created by God could
have rectified the existing sad state of affairs. For we presume that
men are free to do good or evil as they alone choose. If God were to
bring it about that a man does right, if he were to see to it that this
man does not do the wrong thing, this individual would have lost his
defreedom to do either right or wrong. So it seems to the Free Will de
fender.

An important aspiect
aspect of the Free Will Defence thus outlined is that it
denies absolute omnipotence to God. Having created beings with the
freedom to choose, God thereby lacks the power to exercise control
over the decisions of these beings in any manner that would foreclose
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on their freedom. If Lee Harvey Oswald pulled the trigger freely, then
he had the option of either pulling the trigger or not, and provided this
is so, God could not have prevented Oswald's
Oswald’s pulling the trigger.
Thus the Free Will Defence imposes an inherent limitation on divine
omnipotence. If there is to be more than one center of power in the
universe, no one being can be exclusively and totally omnipotent in
the sense of being literally able to bring about or prevent anything. A
plurality of free moral agents necessarily entails a sharing of power
within certain limits that are not very well defined. The limitations on
recogomnipotence inherent in the Free Will Defence has been clearly recog
"What is really characteristic
nized by Alvin Plantinga, who writes, “What
and central to the Free Will Defence is the claim that God, though omom
nipotent, could not have created just any possible world he
pleased. .. .. . "~
pleased.

4. Limits and Omnipotence
The initial problem faced by theologians is that it seems logically ab
absurd to suggest that there can be any limits to omnipotence. For an
omnipotent being can, by definition, have no limits to his power. Yet
several considerations suggest the incoherence of the concept of om
omnipotence construed as the power to do quite literally anything. The
"omnipotence" is fairly exten
extenliterature concerning the definition of “omnipotence”
sive, and it is now time to set out the issues schematically.
(I) Although men from earliest times have called God omnipotent, it
(1)
is not until the Middle Ages that one finds treatments of the possible
limits to omnipotence. One of the earliest is found in the writings of
St. Anselm, who was struck by the fact that men can do certain things
that God cannot do. Men can change, but God who is immutable can
cannot.
However, St. Anselm concluded that the ability to change is re
renot. However,
ally a defect of power, an impotence, and not a power in a positive
sense. Hence he concluded that God is omnipotent because he does
nothing through impotence and nothing has power against him.

(2) But what does it mean to say that nothing has power against God?
Does it mean that God is not bound by the law of non-contradiction?

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Descartes argued
argued that
Descartes
could
not
be
bound by
could not be bound
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since God decreed or created this law, God
it.

(3) However,
However, views like Descartes’
Descartes' had seemed unreasonable to St.
St.
(3)
Thomas Aquinas,
Aquinas, and in fact it has seemed unreasonable to the major
majorThomas
ity of
of theologians
theologians to require of an omnipotent being that he be able to
ity
bring about states of affairs that exemplify self-contradictions or other
logical inconsistencies. A world in which God could bring it about that
simultablack is white, or in which Caesar on some historic occasion simulta
neously crossed
crossed the
the Rubicon
Rubicon and did not cross that river, is a world
neously
that we would be hard pressed to imagine or understand. Of course if
we regard
regard the
the law
law of
of non-contradiction
non-contradiction and similar binary principles of
we
standard first-order
standard
first-order logic as artificial contrivances, we might fail to see
any good
good reason
reason why God, in his infinite wisdom, should be bound to
any
this two-valued
two-valued conventional system.
system . Yet the demand for logical con
conthis
sistency goes deep, and to jettison it without a clear alternative yields
a total bereftness of orientation which seems tantamount to a Kierkegaardian
irrationalism. Perhaps ultimately in the religious quest,
kegaardian irrationalism.
consistency must be surrendered, but to do so will reduce our ability to
attain even
even aa dim and imperfect grasp of the divine nature, admittedly
attain
the best we can aspire to. To proceed further we must concede that an
omnipotent
being need not be required to be able to instantiate selfomnipotent being
contradictions
like.. Nor do we normally require of finite
contradictions and the like
beings that they ever have this power, so perhaps this limitation ap
applies to all power generally and not uniquely or distinctively to an omom
nipotent
agent.
nipotent agent.
((4)
4) For
parallel reasons, we need not require of an omnipotent agent,
For parallel
or
or any
any agent,
agent, that he be able to bring about states of affairs that are
logically
logically possible but nevertheless "unbringaboutable."
“unbringaboutable.” For example,
the
the following state of affairs is logically contingent: the door is open
but
but II do
do not
not directly
directly bring it about that the door is open. An instance
would occur, say, where you open the door. Yet it is impossible that I
myself
myself should
should bring about this state of affairs. It is absurd that I should
directly bring it about .both that the door is open and that I do v.ot
not didi
rectly bring it about that the door is open. Thus there are certain states
of affairs that, while they do not admit of logical inconsistency in
themselves, are unbringaboutable by a certain agent, for bringing
them
them about
about is
is logically impossible for that agent to do.
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appropriate . If an
tenninology might seem appropriate.
(5) At this point a shift in terminology
anything,
literally
omnipotent being must be one who can bring about
anything,
less
it is less
perhaps
even one of the peculiar states of affairs listed above,
omnipoabsolutely
misleading to say that God is almighty rather than
omnipo
tent, meaning that he is all-powerful only within certain conceptual
theomany theo
limits. Some have wanted to be even more restrictive. To many
has
it
entrapment,
logical
of
logians, frightened by the possibility
has
that
only
means
"omnipotence"
that
seemed expedient to say simply
“omnipotence”
that
all power, or that he is "the
God is the source of alt
“the power of Being in
advantages
exists" (Tillich). Whatever conceptual advantages
everything which exists”
adopt it.
to
discussion
our
in
early
too
is
this suggestion may have, it
crewhat
us
tell
not
does
it
for
helpful;
For one thing, it is not very
cre
limCreator
almighty
an
Is
possess.
to
said
be
can
ative powers God
lim
these
ited by the past? Can he lie, cheat, and steal? As to the first of these
omnipoAnselm's account of omnipo
questions, St. Peter Damian, assuming Anselm’s
and is
impotence
through
nothing
does
God
since
tence, argued that
the
change
to
able
be
must
he
himself,
outside
anything
by
not limited
the
St.
past, because the past is something outside God. To the contrary, St.
changGod's control, since chang
Thomas Aquinas argued the past is not in God’s
phiing the past is an incoherent notion. This is really an issue in the phi
"Can God make time go
losophy of time and is similar to the problem “Can
apnot ap
backward?" If at t, God puts the universe in reverse, it does not
backward?”
forward .
pear that time goes backward, but that time continues to go forward.
reversed . Likewise at t God decreed that
Only the causal sequence is reversed.
Rome should be founded, and at t' that it should be destroyed. But it
does not seem possible for God to have decreed that at t' Rome should
not have been; time has been continually moving ahead, and the past
is lost to the control of any power. Although Peter Damian attempted to
God's
answer this challenge by an appeal to the atemporal character of God’s
will, it seems best to think of power as essentially furture-directed,
to
power to
the power
and we ought not require that an omnipotent agent have the
past.
the past.
change the
of
(6) Certain theological constraints are introduced by the assumption of
the moral perfection of God
God.. It would appear to be inconsistent with
be
much of the western theological tradition to allow that God could be
tired, oblivious, or angry, that God could be deceived, circumvented,
or frustrated, that God could break a promise or commit any kind of
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moral indiscretion.
indiscretion. The
The reason for these restrictions is that omnipo
omnipomoral
tence is only one of God’s
God's perfections. If God is that being than which
no greater
greater or
more perfect
perfect can be conceived, he must be morally per
perno
or more
fect
and
he
must
perfection . A
fect and he must be omnipotent because of his moral perfection.
God who
who could
could not carry out his good designs would not be as perfect
God
as
one
who
can. Thus some of God’s
God's perfections limit others. In par
paras one who can.
ticular,
a
Christian
cannot
believe
in absolute, uncircumscribed omnip
omnipticular, a Christian
otence.
otence.
(7) If
is that
that being
being than
than which no greater or more perfect can be
(7)
If God
God is
conceived,
then
it
appears
conceived, then it appears that there can be only one of him. For if
there were
were two
two Gods,
Gods, neither
neither could be more perfect. Likewise Duns
there
Scotus
argued
that
if
"omnipotence"
Scotus argued that if “omnipotence” means "unlimited
“unlimited by anything
outside
the
self,"
then
there
could
be
only
one
omnipotent being.
being . If
outside the self,”
there
were
two,
each
would
limit
the
other;
and
hence
neither
would
there were two,
be
omnipotent.
However,
suppose
"omnipotence"
is
defined
as
"the
be omnipotent.
“omnipotence”
“the
ability
to
do
anything
which
does
not
involve
a
contradiction."
Then,
ability to do
contradiction.”
as William of Ockham pointed out, there could be more than one omom
nipotent being
being if they are necessitated by nature to co-operate with
nipotent
each other.
other. This
subtle shift
shift in the definition of "omnipotence"
each
This subtle
“omnipotence” has
enormous
consequences
and
puts
considerable
strain
upon our natural
enormous consequences and puts considerable
conceptual
scheme.
conceptual
(8) But does God necessarily will what he wills? Spinoza argued that
the perfection of God demands that he wills what he wills necessarily.
God's will is necessitated can he be free from any external in
inOnly if God’s
fluence. The majority of theologians have rejected this suggestion, ar
arguing instead that the freedom to choose between alternatives is a per
perfection, and that, therefore, God must have it.
(9) It might seem absurd to require that an omnipotent agent must be
able to bring about states of affairs that are self-limiting, that is, states
of affairs that might result in a loss of power by the agent. However,
Bishop Charles Gore thought that God must be able to divest himself
of some of his power. According to him, the omnipotent God must be
able to lay aside his omnipotence if he were to become truly incarnate
in Jesus of Nazareth. This kenotic theory of the incarnation seems to
lead directly to the paradoxical assertion that an omnipotent agent is
not omnipotent if he cannot divest himself of some of his power.
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A similar problem can be put in the form of a dilemma: can God
create a stone that is too heavy for him to lift? If
If not, he is not omnipomnip
otent. If so, he is not omnipotent either, since there is something he
he
cannot lift. One way out of this dilemma,
dilemma. Bishop Gore to the contrary,
is to relax the requirement that an omnipotent being can do just anyany
thing, ruling that such a being need not be required to bring about selflimiting states of affairs.
( l 0) However, to adopt the strategy just outlined may bring us into
(10)
conflict with the Free Will Defence. We have already observed that a
universe containing a plurality of free agents necessitates a different
kind of limit on the sphere of the power of even an almighty agent.
For if the actions of men are sometimes free, as seems required if they
are to be held morally accountable, the control of a creator over these
free actions will have to be sufficiently indirect and subtle not to
negate that freedom. A totally omnipotent being, rigidly conceived,
must, as such, usurp all power, leaving no room for human controllers
or other free agencies such as Satan and his cohorts.
(11) But then could God create beings who always freely choose the
good? Some have argued that only by necessitating the agents could
God create a world in which men always choose the good. However, he
has created a world in which men sometimes freely choose the good.
Why, then, could he not create a world in which they always choose
bethe good? The logic of this problem is not well understood; and be
cause of this fact, it is fitting to refer the reader to the concluding
selections.
( 12) Finally, it might be argued that an omnipotent being should not
(12)
observabe required to violate the lawlike regularities of nature. This observa
tion raises the question whether miracles involve violations of physical
laws, and is thus a wider and separate problem to some extent. As
volsuch it raises issues which are too extensive to be included in this vol
ume. Suffice it to remark that it may be theologically preferable to
countenance the notion of an almighty God whose agency is seen as
nexus.
the causal
operational only within certain limits of the
causal nexus.
Notice that
well as to

some of the
an almighty

limits listed above apply to
agent, whereas some mark

finite agents as
limits that are
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unique to divine power. Finite agents often and typically bring about
self-limiting states of affairs; many of the things we do result in in
inabilities to do other things. And (6) shows that, somewhat paradox
paradoxically, there are many things that you or I can do that God cannot-for
cannot—for
example,
example, execute twenty-five pushups or cheat at backgammon.

If we reflect on the several kinds of limitations, it may well be that if
we
miniwe are to have a concept of omnipotence or almightiness that is mini
mally logically consistent, and consistent with the mainstream of the
western theological tradition, we must accept certain conceptual limits
on
on the divine power. That none of these limits are as clear or wellbehaved as we might like indicates at once the difficulty of constructbehaved
construct
ing a consistent and adequate theodicy and the problems inherent in
ing
giving a clear account of the deep skeptical worries and doubts about
the problem of evil. Only through further attempts to define and clarify
the scope and nature of the several limits can a definitive under
understanding
standing of these classical problems be expedited. The necessity for
these
these limits may ultimately be due to intrinsic conceptual limitations of
the
the human understanding. There may still remain some sense not very
well
well understood, in which it is correct to say that pure potency has no
limits. Conceptual limits are not to be confused with deficiencies.
limits.
At any rate, we hope to have shown the need for the analysis of the atat
tribute of
tribute
of omnipotence, both as a required item of vocabulary in the
adjudication and rational understanding of the dialogue between the
adjudication
theologian and the secular skeptic, and as an essential element in systheologian
sys
tematic
tematic theology. Logic is no more a good substitute for faith than for
creativity,
vision, inspiration or beauty. Yet when inconsistency runs
creativity, vision,
deep,
to
the
very roots of belief, to the essential foundations of our
deep,
commitments,
commitments, dissonance dulls and clouds belief; and logical considconsid
erations
erations play
play a role in the eventual readjustment to consistency. An
awareness
awareness of
of the importance of the place of logic in theology is concon
veyed
in
the
veyed in the work of the great scholastics, in their judicious balance of
faith and reason.
reason . Logic is neither the beginning nor the end of rere
ligious
belief,
ligious belief, but an illogical theology is unworthy of and cannot supsup
port aa mature
mature faith
port
faith..
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